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INTRODUCTION
The art of patent prosecution is becoming more and more
complicated, challenging, and risky.
In recent years, patent
practitioners have endeavored to master the implications and
strategic opportunities resulting from the American Inventors
1
2
Protection Act and all of the associated rule changes. In addition,
recent decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court have necessitated significant changes
3
in how patent applications are drafted and prosecuted. The Federal
Circuit’s recent decision in Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson
4
Medical, holding that laches may “bar enforcement of patent claims
5
issued after an unreasonable and unexplained delay in prosecution,”
adds to the challenge by raising questions about the extent to which
patent applicants can take advantage of strategic opportunities
presented by the patent statute and administrative rules of the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) without jeopardizing their
6
rights.
Symbol Technologies also potentially implicates the ethical obligations
of patent practitioners. This issue—whether practitioners may be
subject to discipline for purposefully delaying the prosecution of
their clients’ patent applications—is considered below. Because the
1. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of
35 U.S.C.) (amending the patent law and reorganizing the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (“PTO”)).
2. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 1.902-.907 (2003) (permitting reexamination rights for
third parties); 37 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 5 (2003) (providing for the public disclosure of
patent applications after eighteen months); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.701 & 1.702-.705 (2003)
(compensating patentees for delays in the application examination process by
providing patent term adjustments).
3. These decisions include the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court decisions in
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000),
vacated by 535 U.S. 722 (2002), and the Federal Circuit’s recent en banc decision in
Johnson & Johnston Associates Inc. v. R.E. Service Co., 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
The judgments in Festo concern the extent to which claim amendments made during
prosecution impair a patentee’s ability to assert infringement under the judiciallycreated doctrine of equivalents. See Festo, 535 U.S. at 737-40 (concluding that while
an amendment is not an absolute bar to infringement claims, a patentee must prove
the amendment did not relinquish the equivalent in question). In Johnson &
Johnston, the Federal Circuit held that subject matter disclosed in a patent
application, but not recited in the claims, is per se dedicated to the public. 285 F.3d
at 1054.
4. 277 F.3d 1361, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1515 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 825 (2002).
5. Id. at 1363, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516.
6. See generally Michael T. Hawkins, Prosecution Laches in the Wake of Symbol
Technologies: What is “Unreasonable and Unexplained” Delay?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1621,
1655-60 (2003) (analyzing factors for distinguishing between legitimate “commercial
gamesmanship” and “unreasonable and unexplained delay” for purposes of
prosecution laches).
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issue requires consideration of the history and contours of the
“prosecution laches” doctrine, the development of the doctrine is
7
first reviewed. Specifically, Part I of this Article examines the history
of prosecution laches in the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts. Part II then describes and analyzes the Federal Circuit’s
decision in Symbol Technologies, and identifies questions it leaves
unresolved. Finally, Part III considers the extent to which the
decision implicates the ethical obligations of prosecution counsel.
I.

PROSECUTION LACHES: A HISTORY OF AMBIGUITY
AND AMBIVALENCE
A. Prosecution Laches in the Supreme Court

Woodbridge and Webster
Nearly eighty years ago, the Supreme Court had occasion to
consider the effect of an applicant’s prosecution delays on its patent
8
rights in a pair of cases. In Woodbridge v. United States, the Court
upheld a decision of the U.S. Court of Claims refusing to compensate
9
an inventor for the alleged use of his invention by the United States.
The inventor filed his patent application, which involved rifle
10
projectiles, in February 1852.
The Patent Office examined the
application and advised the inventor regarding allowable subject
matter. Woodbridge then amended his claims accordingly and
requested that the Patent Office delay the issuance of his patent for
11
one year, as was then authorized by statute. Neither the Patent
Office nor the inventor took any action regarding the patent for the
12
next nine and one-half years.
In December 1861, however, the
inventor wrote to the Patent Office requesting issuance of the patent
1.

7. “Prosecution laches” has alternatively been referred to as “continuing
application laches” or “undue delay of prosecution.” See generally Thomas G.
Eschweiler, Ford v. Lemelson and Continuing Application Laches, 79 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 401, 403 (1997) (attempting to answer whether the
“continuing application laches” defense is still a viable defense by analyzing the
history and development of the relevant case law and legislative histories).
8. 263 U.S. 50 (1923).
9. Id. at 51, 63.
10. Id. at 51.
11. Id. at 52-53. According to the Woodbridge Court, this statute authorized a
delay of up to one year to give the inventor time to prepare and submit a model. Id.
at 58. The inventor had already submitted his model, but requested the delay to
prevent publication of the patent from affecting the possibility of obtaining a patent
in a foreign jurisdiction. See id. at 52, 58. The Court noted, though, that he never
applied for a foreign patent. Id. at 58.
12. Id. at 53.
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and noted that he had “allowed [the patent] to remain until the
present time, it being only lately that any immediate opportunity of
13
rendering it pecuniarily available has occurred.” At the same time,
14
Woodbridge also requested certain broadening amendments.
The Patent Office refused to issue the patent, with or without the
15
amendments, on the ground of abandonment. According to the
Patent Office, many inventors had obtained patents and made
advancements in this field of invention while Woodbridge
unjustifiably delayed the issuance of his patent until he could exploit
16
its commercial value. Likewise, the Court of Claims refused the
inventor’s request for compensation for the government’s alleged use
of the invention on the ground that his deliberate delay in requesting
issuance of the approved patent resulted in an unenforceable patent
17
as a matter of equity.
The Supreme Court affirmed, stating the legislative purpose
behind the seventeen-year non-extendable term enacted in 1861 was
to permit unencumbered public access to the invention following its
expiration. The court stated that “[a]ny practice by the inventor . . .
through which he deliberately and without excuse postpones beyond
the date of the actual invention, the beginning of the term of his
18
monopoly, . . . is an evasion of the statute.” The Court explained its
decision that the inventor had forfeited his right to a patent as
follows:
In this case we have a delay of 9 1/2 years in securing a patent that
might have been had at any time in that period for the asking, and
this for the admitted purpose of making the term of the monopoly
square with the period when the commercial profit from it would be
highest. Not until war or fear of war came was there likely to be a
strong demand for rifled cannon and their improvement. Hence the
inventor, having put his order for the issue of a patent into the secret
archives of the Patent Office in 1852, sat down and waited until after
the Civil War came on in 1861 before seeking to avail himself of the
patent, thus postponing the time when the public could freely enjoy it
for nearly 10 years. Meantime other inventors had been at work in
the same field and had obtained patents without knowledge of the
situation . . . . When [the inventor] conceived that the time . . . had
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 54 (noting that the PTO informed Woodbridge that the “length of
time he had allowed his invention to slumber was a bar to the issue of the patent”).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 55.
18. Id. at 56.
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come to assert his monopoly, he became aware of the fact that in his
specifications and claims, as allowed, he had not covered the real
advance made by his unconscious competitors, [and] he applied for a
change of specifications and claims, so that he might cover the
patents of these subsequent inventors.19

In particular, the Court noted that had the inventor “succeeded in
his illegal plan,” nearly ten years of “unconscionable postponement
20
of the end of his monopoly” would have resulted.
21
The following year, in Webster Electric Co. v. Splitdorf Electric Co., the
Supreme Court again refused to enforce patent claims filed after
22
what the Court regarded as an “unreasonable” delay. The patent at
issue in Webster was a divisional of an application originally filed in
23
February 1910. A first divisional application was filed in 1914 for the
purpose of provoking an interference with another party’s issued
24
patent. The divisional at issue in Webster was filed in 1915 to provoke
yet another interference. However, the claims at issue, which were
broader than those copied for purposes of the interference and were
apparently filed after the applicant lost the interference, were not
25
added until 1918.
In refusing to enforce the claims at issue, the Supreme Court noted
that the inventor had no intention to assert claims to the subject
matter in question until after that subject matter “was disclosed and
26
in general use.” According to the Court, the inventor “simply stood
by and awaited developments” during the period of “unreasonable
27
delay and neglect.” That the inventor was engaged for several of the

19. Id.
20. Id. at 58-59.
21. 264 U.S. 463 (1924).
22. Id. at 466.
23. Id. at 464. A patent applicant may only receive one patent per invention. See
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). Accordingly, when an application presents claims to two or
more independent and distinct inventions, the Commissioner may require the
applicant to restrict its claims to a single invention for prosecution within that
application. See id. § 121. The application carved out of the earlier application is a
“divisional application.” Assuming proper compliance with Section 120, the
divisional application is entitled to the same filing date as the parent application
from which it arose. See id. (“If the other invention is made the subject of a divisional
application which complies with the requirements of Section 120 of this title it shall
be entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the original application.”).
24. Webster, 264 U.S. at 464.
25. See id. at 464-65 (characterizing the applicant as negligent for waiting eight
years and four months after the initial filing to assert the broader claims).
26. Id. at 465.
27. Id. The Court distinguished the situation in Webster from “the simple case of
a division of a single application for several independent inventions” by noting that
the claims at issue were added after the conclusion of interferences involving
narrower claims. Id. at 465-66.
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eight years between the filing of the parent application and the
amendment adding the claims at issue in separate interferences with
different third parties “afford[ed] no just excuse for the failure to
28
assert the broader claims.” To the contrary, the Court regarded the
“long delay” as evidence supporting the conclusion that the claims at
issue were “an exigent afterthought, rather than a logical
29
development of the original application.”
2.

Intervening adverse rights
The other Supreme Court decisions relating to the effect of
applicant delays on patent rights concern the definition and
significance of “intervening adverse rights.” In Overland Motor Co. v.
30
Packard Motor Car Co., the Court held that an infringement suit
cannot be dismissed merely because the patentee repeatedly took
advantage of the entire statutory period for responding to Patent
Office actions and voluntarily filed a divisional application to obtain
28. See id. at 466. Although the claims at issue in Webster were broader than those
involved in the interferences, they did not, according to the Court, embrace subject
matter “of such complicated character that it might not have been readily described
in the original applications.” Id.
29. Id. In holding the inventor’s patent rights forfeited, the Webster Court noted
the importance of not interpreting the patent so narrowly as to discourage “creative
genius,” but further observed that “it is no less important that the law shall not be so
loosely construed and enforced as to subvert its limitations, and bring about an
undue extension of the patent monopoly against private and public rights.” Id.
In an apparent effort to delineate the boundary between reasonable and
unreasonable delay, the Webster Court devoted the remainder of its opinion to
endorsing a two-year time limit on the filing of divisional applications “in cases
involving laches, equitable estoppel or intervening private or public rights.” See id. at
466-71 (determining that two years is the presumptive limit for an unreasonable
delay). According to the Court, the two-year limit, avoidable only “by proof of special
circumstances justifying a longer delay,” was defended by way of analogy to the thenapplicable, judge-made prohibition against enforcing reissue patents sought more
than two years after original issuance. Id. The two-year reissue limit had itself been
adopted by analogy to the various statutes in effect at the time that imposed a limit of
two years for filing applications, including a two-year pre-filing public use grace
period. Id. at 470-71.
Several years later, the Supreme Court acknowledged that its pronouncements in
Webster regarding a two-year limit on divisional applications were dicta. See Crown
Cork & Seal Co. v. Ferdinand Gutmann Co., 304 U.S. 159, 167 (1938) (asserting that
the two-year limit pronouncements were made merely to clarify the lower court’s
erroneous interpretation). In Crown Cork, however, the significance of intervening
adverse rights, or more precisely the lack thereof, was placed squarely in issue by the
intermediate appellate court’s ruling invalidating a patent granted on a divisional
application filed more than two years after a patent issued on the original
application. Id. The Crown Cork Court clarified the Webster two-year “rule,” holding
that filing a divisional application more than two years after an original application
was not subject to the Webster two-year limitation without intervening adverse rights.
See id. at 161, 164, 167-68 (condoning delay where there was no adverse use of the
previously disclosed but unclaimed invention prior to the filing date of the divisional
application upon which the patent in dispute eventually issued).
30. 274 U.S. 417 (1927).
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the claim at issue after it had been finally rejected in the parent
31
application. Given the facts at issue in Symbol Technologies, discussed
32
below, several aspects of Overland Motor are worth noting. First, it
was undisputed that the patentee fully complied with all applicable
33
statutory and Patent Office requirements.
Second, the patentee
34
offered no excuse for the delay. Third, in declining to act in equity
to authorize dismissal of the infringement action, even when
confronted with the infringement defendant’s account of the
35
potential for the perpetration of mischief via prosecution delay, the
Court pled infirmity, declaring that it was wholly within the realm of
36
Congress, not the courts, to reduce the statutory time period.
37
However, as has been argued elsewhere, the key to understanding
the Court’s refusal to intervene in equity appears to lie in its further
observation that “[w]e do not know on what principle we could apply
the equitable doctrine of abandonment by laches in a case where the
measure of reasonable promptness is fixed by statute, and no other
38
ground appears by reason of which laches could be imputed to the applicant.”
The Court observed that there was no product on the United States
market prior to the issuance of the patent involving the subject
39
matter of the suit.
It also characterized Woodbridge as an
“exceptional” case in which the patent applicant sought “to postpone
the period of its monopoly until a national emergency might arise in
which his invention, which was for rifling cannon, should be more in
31. Id. at 422-24. The applicant in Overland Motor had, on at least eight different
occasions during prosecution of the parent and divisional applications, taken more
than eleven months to respond to outstanding office actions. Id. at 419. The
statutory period for response at the time was one year. Id. at 422-23.
32. See infra notes 117-129 and accompanying text.
33. Overland Park, 274 U.S. at 422-24.
34. See id. at 422 (conceding there is no requirement that applicant respond with
utmost diligence provided such response is made within the time period allowed by
statute).
35. The infringement defendant argued that:
[B]y waiting a year after each official action [an applicant can:] (1) keep his
application pending so as to enable him to withhold, indefinitely, his
invention from the public, (2) add claims to his application covering the
independent intervening developments of others, and (3) postpone the time
when the public may enjoy the free use of the invention—all contrary to
sound public policy.
Id. at 423.
36. See id. (indicating that Congress reduced the time period from an indefinite
time period in 1861, to two years in 1897, and to six months in 1927).
37. See David L. Marcus, Is the Submarine Patent Torpedoed?: Ford Motor Co. v.
Lemelson and the Revival of Continuation Application Laches, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 521, 548
(1997) (suggesting that the Supreme Court’s refusal to derail the infringement suit
in Overland Motor was attributable to the absence of equitable justifications
supporting such a result).
38. Overland Motor, 274 U.S. at 424 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 420.
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40

demand than it then was.” These aspects of the Court’s analysis
support interpreting Overland Motor to mean that even extended
prosecution delay that postpones the expiration date of the
patentee’s right of exclusion does not justify equitable intervention in
the absence of intervening adverse rights.
The Court’s decision in General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western
41
Electric Co. further confirms that intervening adverse rights are
essential to a challenge based on prosecution delay. The petitioner
in General Talking Pictures based its challenge on the patentee’s first
presentation of claims in a voluntary divisional or “continuation”
42
application more than two years after the patentee’s own public use
43
Noting that the claims of both the
of the claimed invention.
continuation and original applications had the same effective dates,
that the only public use of the invention at issue was the patentee’s
own, and that that public use did not precede the filing dates of the
original applications by more than two years (so as not to run afoul of
then-applicable statutory two-year pre-filing grace period), the Court
44
rejected the challenge.
45
Taken together, the relevant Supreme Court decisions thus
illustrate that a patent challenger must establish that adverse rights
arose, or at least existed, during the period of alleged prosecution
46
delay. In addition, Woodbridge and Webster suggest that a challenger
47
can rely, for this purpose, on the intervening rights of third parties.
40. Id. at 426-27.
41. 304 U.S. 175 (1938). The Court decided General Talking Pictures on the same
day as Crown Cork, discussed supra note 29.
42. A continuation application is a patent application filed during the pendency
in the PTO of an original parent application that employs the identical disclosure. A
continuation application may not include new additional material in the
specification. See Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials
America, Inc., 98 F.3d 1568, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 1822 (1997) (noting that a continuation application is based solely on the
disclosure of the parent application).
43. Gen. Talking Pictures, 304 U.S. at 182; see also Crown Cork & Seal Co. v.
Ferdinand Gutmann Co., 304 U.S. 159, 167 (1938) (explaining further the Webster
Court’s rationale for the two-year “rule”).
44. Gen. Talking Pictures, 304 U.S. at 183. Justice Black, dissenting, apparently
doubted the legitimacy of divisional and continuation applications generally, and
would have invalidated the claims in question because they were presented more
than two years after the invention was in public use. See id. at 188-90 (noting that
divisional and continuation applications were not then authorized by statute).
45. The Supreme Court has not had occasion to further refine the doctrine of
prosecution laches since its decisions in Crown Cork and General Talking Pictures.
46. The decision in General Talking Pictures established that the patentee’s public
activities during the period of delay are irrelevant, as long as the claims in question
are entitled to the benefit of a filing date within the statutory grace period. Id. at
182.
47. In Woodbridge v. United States, 263 U.S. 50, 56-57 (1923), the United States was
the challenger, and the Supreme Court referred to “other inventors” and “many
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However, several important questions were left unresolved by these
decisions. First, what activities or events qualify as “adverse rights”?
Second, is a challenge based on prosecution delay limited to claims
that were first presented or broadened after the adverse rights arose,
or is it enough that the claims in question issued after significant
48
applicant delay?
With regard to the first of these questions, the Court in Woodbridge
referred to the work of other inventors, including those who had
obtained patents, and the government’s use of their “advances in the
49
art.” In Webster, the Court noted that the subject matter in question
“was disclosed and in general use” prior to the presentation of the
50
challenged claims, but did not say where or how the subject matter
had been disclosed or used. However, in ascribing no significance to
the fact that the subject matter at issue had been disclosed in U.S.
and foreign publications and actually used “abroad” during the
51
pendency of the patentee’s U.S. patent applications, the Court in
Overland Motor appears to have excluded U.S. and foreign
publications, as well as use in foreign countries, from the definition
of intervening adverse rights. Subject matter patented in the United
52
States, though, appears to qualify, as does domestic use of the
53
invention recited in the claims at issue.
inventors” who were working in the “same field” as that of the plaintiff and who had
“obtained patents” and “made advances [that] the government had used . . . .”
Similarly, the Court in Webster Electric Co. v. Slitdorf Electric Co., 264 U.S. 463, 465
(1924), noted that the subject matter in question “was disclosed and in general use.”
48. A related, arguably unresolved, question is whether forfeiture may be found
in the absence of the filing of a second or subsequent patent application. Although
no such application was filed in Woodbridge, the inventor unsuccessfully sought to
amend his patent when he requested that it issue. Woodbridge, 263 U.S. at 54. The
patent rights in question issued only after the inventor succeeded in procuring
special congressional legislation. Id. at 51. The peculiar facts presented in
Woodbridge are, therefore, arguably analogous to the procurement of patent rights by
way of continuation application, as well as the other pertinent Supreme Court cases
involving continuation or divisional applications.
49. See id. at 57 (discussing the repercussions that every patentee faces by
withholding his inventiveness from the public).
50. Webster, 264 U.S. at 465.
51. See Overland Motor Co. v. Packard Motor Car Co., 274 U.S. 417, 419-20
(1927) (holding that use of the subject matter abroad only implicated the original
and divisional applications, but not the particular claims in suit).
52. From the context in which the Woodbridge Court refers to the “many patents
[that] had issued for the same invention,” it appears that at least some of the patents
in question were U.S. patents. See Woodbridge, 263 U.S. at 54 (noting that because the
patent application in question was held for the nine and one-half year period of
delay in the Patent Office’s “secret archives,” the application was “locked up, not
merely beyond the reach of the public, but beyond even the cognizance of the
examiners” and that, in the “meantime many patents had issued for the same
invention”) (emphasis added).
53. Overland Motor, 274 U.S. at 420.

DOLAK.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

748

7/6/2004 7:30 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:739

As to whether prosecution laches is limited to situations where
claims are added or changed after adverse rights arose, the claims at
issue in Woodbridge were those that were pending before the invention
54
was used by others, whereas those challenged in Webster had been
55
introduced after the asserted intervening uses. On the one hand,
this may indicate that prosecution laches may be found even where
the claims at issue were not added or broadened after the adverse
use. However, the unusual circumstances of Woodbridge make
drawing any conclusion regarding this issue difficult.
Overland Motor presented the Court with an opportunity to provide
guidance. There, the applicant’s claims to the “subject matter in suit”
were apparently presented before, and were pending throughout, the
56
period of delay.
However, by distinguishing Woodbridge without
commenting on the significance of the late presentation of claims in
that case, the Court left open the question of whether such action is
57
an element of the defense.
B. The Lower Federal Courts Struggle with Prosecution Laches
Although the Supreme Court cases relating to prosecution laches
left unanswered certain questions regarding the precise contours of
the doctrine, they left no doubt that patent rights were, in some
circumstances, subject to forfeiture based on applicant delay. In the
years since the Supreme Court’s last decision on the subject, the
lower federal courts have disagreed regarding not only when
forfeiture is appropriate, but whether a patent can ever be held
invalid or unenforceable under a prosecution laches theory.

54. The opinion in Woodbridge states that the Patent Office refused to issue the
patent with or without the requested amendment following the period of delay.
Woodbridge, 263 U.S. at 54. Subsequently, however, the inventor in Woodbridge
secured special legislation granting him patent rights subject to the condition that he
satisfy the court that he had not forfeited his rights by delay. Id. at 51. See also
Overland Motor, 274 U.S. at 418 (noting the particular legislation upon which the
inventor in Woodbridge relied for the purpose of obtaining his patent). He was,
however, apparently relegated to the claims that had been allowed before the delay.
See Woodbridge, 263 U.S. at 63 (concluding that Woodbridge’s delay in requesting
issuance constituted forfeiture of his right to a patent).
55. Webster, 264 U.S. at 464-65.
56. See Overland Motor, 274 U.S. at 419 (describing the particular facts relating to
the petitioner’s initial and subsequent patent applications).
57. If applicant delay plus intervening adverse rights plus the “late” introduction
of new or broader claims is required to establish prosecution laches, other questions
remain unanswered. For example, are claims that were pending before the delay
began also tainted because they issue in the same patent with “late” claims (i.e., do all
of the claims of a patent tainted by delay fall together)? And must adverse rights
originate during the delay, as opposed to before it begins?
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In several cases, patent challengers succeeded in invoking a
prosecution laches-style defense. For example, in Pratt & Whitney Co.
58
v. United States, the U.S. Court of Claims dismissed a petition for
compensation from the United States where the asserted claims were
first presented in a divisional application filed nine years after the
parent application was filed and six years after the accused device was
59
“in public use and on sale.” Similarly, in Monsanto Co. v. Rohm &
60
Haas Co., the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
held invalid claims presented almost ten years after the application
containing the supporting disclosure was filed, seven and a half years
after the patentee learned of the defendant’s South African patent
claiming the same chemical compound, approximately seven years
after representatives of the patentee attended a conference where a
U.S. government official described the compound’s herbicidal
properties, and almost six years after the patentee learned that the
61
defendant was selling the compound as a herbicide.
Other courts were less hospitable to the defense. Several relied on
62
the express provision in 35 U.S.C. § 120 that claims supported by an
earlier-filed disclosure in a parent application are entitled to the
benefit of the parent’s filing date if the requirements of Section 120
63
are met. According to one court:
58. 345 F.2d 838, 145 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 429 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
59. Id. at 843-44, 145 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 432-33.
60. 312 F. Supp. 778, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 556 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
61. Id. at 783-85, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 560-62. The original patent application
disclosed a large class of compounds and stated that the compounds possessed
herbicidal activity. The application also included claims to herbicidal compositions
and method of use claims, but no claim to any compound per se was presented during
its prosecution. Id. at 783-85, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 560-61. The patentee filed a
continuation-in-part application one month after the patentee learned of the
defendant’s sales of the compound in question, but again did not include claims to
that or any other compound per se. Id. at 784-85, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 561-62.
Several years later, after an interference involving that application was declared
between the patentee and the eventual defendant in the infringement action, the
patentee filed a motion to add a claim to the compound to the application. The
motion was denied. Id. at 785, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 562. The application that
resulted in the patent in suit, including the claim at issue, was filed nearly three years
after the attempt to amend the continuation-in-part application, almost six years
after that application was filed. Id., 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 562.
A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
district court’s judgment of invalidity, but confined its discussion to the district
court’s ruling that the patent was procured by fraudulent misrepresentation. See
Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 456 F.2d 592, 596, 600-01, 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
323, 325-26, 329 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding that the patentee’s failure to disclose
important information in his application was contrary to equitable standards of
conduct owed to the public).
62. 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2000).
63. See, e.g., Haney v. Timesavers, Inc., 900 F. Supp. 1378, 1382 (D. Or. 1995)
(noting that “35 U.S.C. § 120 expressly permits [the patentee] to file additional
applications to obtain additional claims”); see also Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc.
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By providing this relation back doctrine, Congress evidenced a
clear intent to regulate the timing of continuation applications.
Accordingly, only Congress can determine what constitutes
unreasonable delay in the filing of such an application. It is not for
this Court to decide that the prosecution of a patent according to
64
the rules of the PTO is unreasonable and inequitable.

Another court distinguished Woodbridge as limited to situations
where the patentee had delayed to achieve a postponement of the
65
term of the patent.
The same court appeared to have more
difficulty with Webster, where the term was not extended in the
Woodbridge sense, since the claims at issue were presented in a
66
divisional application that complied with the applicable law.
Although it regarded Webster as “closely analogous,” it nonetheless
denied the patent challengers’ motion for summary judgment based
on laches because the defendants had “little evidence” that the claims
67
at issue were presented as a “mere afterthought.” The court further
v. Medtronic, Inc., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1770, 1774-75, No. C-96-0942 DLJ, 1996 WL
467273, at **4-5 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 1996) (striking with prejudice an affirmative
defense reciting laches and estoppel due to prosecution delay “since there is no
allegation that plaintiff violated any of the statutory or regulatory rules for
prosecuting patents”); Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 40
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1291, 1295, No. C-95-3577 DLJ, 1996 WL 467293, at **11-12 (N.D.
Cal. July 24, 1996) (dismissing with prejudice the defendant’s counterclaims based
on laches and improper delay for the same reasons); Advanced Cardiovascular Sys.,
Inc. v. SciMed Sys., Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1291, 1294-95, No. C-96-0950 DLJ,
1996 WL 467277, at **3-4 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 1996) (striking with prejudice the
defendant’s patent misuse defense grounded on alleged unreasonable prosecution
delay and late presentation of claims for the same reasons).
In all of the Advanced Cardiovascular opinions, the District Court for the Northern
District of California delineated the boundaries of the defense of laches, observing
that “the only delay that can form the basis of a laches defense is delay between the
issuance of the patent and the filing of the infringement action.” Medtronic, 41
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774, 1996 WL 467273, at *4; Medtronic, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1294, 1996 WL 467293, at *11. See also SciMed Sys., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294,
1996 WL 467277, at *4 (holding that “defendant’s theory of laches based on delay in
prosecution of the patent is not cognizable”).
64. Medtronic, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775, 1996 WL 467273, at *5; Medtronic, 40
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1295, 1996 WL 467293, at *12; SciMed Sys., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1295, 1996 WL 467277, at *4.
65. See Progressive Games, Inc. v. Amusements Extra, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1180,
1183, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1849, 1852 (D. Colo. 1999) (noting that derivative
patents at issue were subject to the same termination date as the original patent and
therefore the plaintiff here had not postponed the date of its patent monopoly,
making Woodbridge inapplicable).
66. See id. at 1184-85, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852-53 (stating that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Crown Cork limited the laches doctrine to cases involving both
intervening adverse rights and proof of abandonment by the patentee).
67. Id. at 1184, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852. In this regard, the court seemed to
rely on the fact that the first claim of the parent patent, which, like the continuation
patents in suit, related to electronic poker gaming was, in essence, a genus claim
encompassing different types of jackpots. See id. at 1181, 1184, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1850, 1853 (describing the particular gaming device and concluding that the

DOLAK.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

2004]

7/6/2004 7:30 PM

DELAYING PROSECUTION

751

professed its reluctance to apply laches to an alleged prosecution
68
delay situation when the Federal Circuit had not done so.
These decisions generally reflect the lower courts’ discomfort with
abrogating patent rights obtained in compliance with the applicable
statutory and regulatory provisions. This is particularly so in cases
arising after the codification, in the 1952 Patent Act, of the principle
that claims filed in continuing applications that comply with the law
69
are entitled to the benefit of their respective priority dates. The
most public display of this ambivalence is found in the series of

plaintiff’s delay may have been caused by circumstances beyond his control).
According to the court, “it cannot be said that [the patentee] filed the three patents
at issue in this case as an afterthought, when its original application allowed for the
[specific] type of jackpot encompassed by those patents.” Id. at 1184, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1852-53.
68. See id. at 1184-85, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853 (confirming that while the
Federal Circuit had recognized the possibility for equitable remedies in patent cases
involving lack of diligence, it had yet to apply such remedies to continuation or
continuation-in-part applications). Like others, this court also noted the absence of
a legislative limit on the filing of continuation applications. Id. at 1185, 51
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853.
Notably, it appears that all of the court’s observations relating to the applicability
of prosecution laches precedent and the legitimacy of the defense in light of
congressional silence were dicta, as the court indicated that the defendants had
failed to establish that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the
patentee was even responsible for the alleged delay. Id., 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1853.
69. See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2000) (providing the benefit of the filing date of a first
patent application to a subsequent patent application as long as, inter alia, the prior
application has not been abandoned, terminated, or patented as of when the
subsequent application is filed). The effect of the enactment of Section 120 in 1952
on the defense of prosecution laches has been the subject of significant debate.
Compare Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 1369-71, 61
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1515, 1520-23 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Newman, J., dissenting)
(expressing the view that Congress, in enacting Section 120 without limits on
continuation applications, rejected the viability of prosecution laches as a defense),
Ricoh Co. v. Nashua Corp., 185 F.3d 884, No. 97-1344, 1999 WL 88969, at *3 (Fed.
Cir. Feb. 18, 1999) (refusing to apply the doctrine of intervening rights to limit
patent rights obtained via continuing applications, given the lack of any time limit in
Section 120), Bott v. Four Star Corp., 848 F.2d 1245, Nos. 88-1117, 88-1118, 1988 WL
54107, at *1 (Fed. Cir. May 26, 1988) (refusing to act in equity to limit patent rights
procured via a series of seven continuation applications “when the Congress gave no
indication that it intended to do so”), and Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, 42
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1706, 1709, Nos. CV-N-92-613-LDG, CV-N-92-545-LDG, 1997 WL
294430, at *1709 (D. Nev. Apr. 28, 1997) (interpreting the legislative history of
Section 120 as reflecting congressional intent to impose no limits on continuation
application practice), with Symbol Techs., 277 F.3d at 1365-66, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1518-19 (rejecting the patentee’s argument that Congress abrogated the defense of
prosecution laches by passing Section 120). See generally Eschweiler, supra note 7, at
408-13 (tracing the legislative history of Section 120 and concluding that the defense
of prosecution laches survived its enactment); Marcus, supra note 37, at 560-63
(arguing that Congress, when passing Section 120, intended to preserve the laches
defense).
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decisions issued by the federal district court for the District of Nevada
70
in Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson.
Jerome Lemelson procured hundreds of U.S. patents between 1953
71
and his death in 1997. The eleven patents at issue in Ford Motor
72
related to “Auto-ID” and “machine vision” technology, and issued
from continuing applications claiming priority back to an application
73
filed in 1954.
In her report to the court recommending that Ford’s motion for
summary judgment of unenforceability for “continuing application
74
laches” be granted, the magistrate judge rejected Ford’s argument
that a statutory two-year limit on obtaining broadened claims via
reissue also limits a patentee’s efforts to obtain new claims via
75
continuing applications. However, the magistrate judge determined
that prosecution laches can, and should, bar the enforcement of
patent claims procured by unreasonably delaying the presentation of
claims during prosecution where the delay results in prejudice to the
76
patent challenger.
70. Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, Nos. CV-N-92-613-LDG, CV-N-92-545-LDG, 1995
WL 628330, at *15 (D. Nev. June 16, 1995) (recommending that “Ford’s motion for
summary judgment based upon Lemelson’s undue delay in prosecuting his claims”
be granted); Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1349, No. CV-N-92545-LDG, 1996 WL 673595 (D. Nev. Apr. 11, 1996) (adopting magistrate judge’s
recommendation); Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1706, Nos.
CV-N-92-613-LDG, CV-N-92-545-LDG, 1997 WL 294430 (D. Nev. Apr. 28, 1997)
(vacating order adopting magistrate judge’s recommendation and denying Ford’s
motion for summary judgment).
71. Nicholas Varchaver, The Patent King, FORTUNE, May 14, 2001, at 202, 204
(describing, in detail, Lemelson’s aggressive and unprecedented campaign to
acquire and license patents relating to a wide spectrum of industries, products, and
licensing targets).
72. Ford Motor, 1995 WL 628330, at *1. “Auto-ID” is a type of bar code and
“Machine vision” incorporates cameras to inspect items on an assembly line and
compare the procured images with those stored in memory to detect defects. Id.
73. See id. at **10-12 (detailing the prosecution lineage of the claims in suit).
74. See id. at *2 (noting that summary judgment was appropriate because the
availability of laches as a defense based on prosecution delay is a pure question of law
and no relevant facts were in dispute).
75. See id. at **4-5 (explaining the procedures for continuation and
continuation-in-part applications).
76. See id. at **5-14 (discussing the patentee’s actions in delaying prosecution
and evaluating whether such actions constituted unreasonable delay).
The
magistrate judge specifically identified “prejudice to Ford” as the second element
(along with unreasonable applicant delay) of the defense of prosecution laches. See
id. at *15 (confirming that Ford’s proof that the products were either in
development or on the market prior to the patentee’s asserted claims demonstrated
undue prejudice). In this brief portion of her opinion, however, the magistrate
judge also stated that “Lemelson’s continuing application practice imposes prejudice
upon all manufacturers or users of related products because” it implicates “all
technological advancement arguably related to his 1954 and 1956 applications.” Id.
She thus failed to clarify whether an accused infringer could prevail on a prosecution
laches theory in the absence of personal prejudice.

DOLAK.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

2004]

7/6/2004 7:30 PM

DELAYING PROSECUTION

753

To support this conclusion, the magistrate judge noted, by way of
analogy to the doctrine of unenforceability based on inequitable
77
conduct, that equity can extinguish or limit patent rights based on
78
applicant conduct. She rejected the “extreme view” advanced by
Lemelson, who argued that the statutory scheme immunizes a
patentee from attack based on a theory of prosecution laches no
matter how many continuing applications he employs or how long
79
after filing the original disclosure he presents new claims. She also
rejected Lemelson’s characterization of the applicable precedent and
80
his assignment of responsibility for the delay to the PTO.
The
magistrate judge found the reason for the delay, namely Lemelson’s
desire to wait for products to appear on the market before drafting
81
claims to cover them, unreasonable.
She further rejected
Lemelson’s argument that the Federal Circuit supported the practice
of delaying patent applications to incorporate new and competing
82
technology as an accepted form of “commercial gamesmanship.”
77. As noted in the opinion, “inequitable conduct” is a distinct, specific,
equitable defense based on a patentee’s alleged intent to deceive the PTO by either
failing to disclose material information or submitting false material information,
during the prosecution of the claims at issue. Ford Motor, 1995 WL 628330, at *6
n.12. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) (providing that, in suits for patent infringement, the
defense of “[n]oninfringement, absence of liability for infringement or
unenforceability” may be raised).
78. Ford Motor, 1995 WL 628330, at *6.
79. Id. at *6.
80. See id. at **6-10, 12 (holding that the courts have not yet addressed factual
scenarios such as the one presented in Ford Motor and additionally noting that
Lemelson’s focus on the PTO’s prosecution process was not relevant since the
disputed delay pertained only to Lemelson’s actions during the claim application
process).
81. See id. at **13-15 (noting that this practice frustrates the public policy
surrounding patent protection). As evidence supporting her finding regarding the
reason for the delay, the magistrate judge quoted from a letter written by Lemelson’s
attorney on Lemelson’s behalf during license negotiations with a third party:
I pointed out that Mr. Lemelson currently has more than one hundred fifty
issued and unexpired patents and more than fifty pending applications and
that patents are being filed and issued at the rate of ten to fifteen per year.
The claims of the pending applications are all being carefully drawn to cover practices
in widespread commercial use. In this regard, we anticipate that more than one
hundred fifty claims covering commercial bar coding practices will issue by
mid-1992 with an effective 1956 filing date based on the disclosure of the
Lemelson . . . patents.
Id. at *13 (emphasis added).
82. Id. at **13-15. As described in the magistrate judge’s opinion, this argument
originates from a pair of Federal Circuit cases.
In Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 874, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1384, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1988), the court rejected an argument that amending
or adding claims to a pending patent application for the purpose of covering
another party’s product on the market constitutes inequitable conduct. Specifically,
the Federal Circuit in Kingsdown stated:
[T]here is nothing improper, illegal or inequitable in filing a patent
application for the purpose of obtaining a right to exclude a known
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Nearly one year later, the district court adopted, without comment,
the recommendation of the magistrate judge and entered summary
83
Another year later,
judgment in favor of the accused infringer.
84
upon reconsideration, the court vacated its order of adoption. The
court justified its action by noting that other courts had been
reluctant to introduce considerations of equity into the statutorilyauthorized scheme of continuation applications, and attributed that
reluctance, with approval, to the absence of statutory limits on
85
The court distinguished the rationale of
continuation practice.
competitor’s product from the market; nor is it in any manner improper to
amend to insert claims intended to cover a competitor’s product the
applicant’s attorney has learned about during the prosecution of a patent
application. Any such amendment or insertion must comply with all statutes
and regulations, of course, but, if it does, its genesis in the marketplace is
simply irrelevant and cannot of itself evidence deceitful intent.
Id. at 874, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390.
In State Industries, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1234-37, 224 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 418, 423-26 (Fed. Cir. 1985), the court refused to regard a defendant’s efforts
to produce a competing non-infringing product, which were ultimately unsuccessful
because the patentee later amended a pending application for the express purpose
of covering the product, as willful infringement. There, the court stated that
competitors often attempt to assimilate each other’s new product concepts into their
pending patent applications, justifying their actions by claiming the new
improvement as part of their own invention. State Indus., 751 F.2d at 1235, 224
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 424. “This is a classic commercial gamesmanship under the
patent system but it is not the kind of behavior courts have categorized in the past as
willful infringement, which requires knowledge of the patent.” Id., 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
at 424.
The magistrate judge in Ford Motor regarded these statements in Kingsdown and
State Industries as inapposite, remarking that, in contrast to “Lemelson’s seemingly
infinite introduction of new claims after he has already obtained patents on the
related technology,” Kingsdown involved a six and a half year “‘complex prosecution,
involving submission, rejection, amendment, renumbering, etc., of 118 claims, a
continuation application, an appeal, a petition to make special, and citation and
discussion of 44 references,’” and stands only for the proposition “that drawing
claims to read on currently marketed technology is not in itself evidence of intent to
act inequitably.” Ford Motor, 1995 WL 628330, at *14 (quoting Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at
869, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386). Further, in the view of the magistrate judge, the
State Industries rationale applies to competing manufacturers designing around each
other’s patent rights, not to a non-manufacturing patentee who “designs his claims
on top of existing inventions for the purpose of creating infringements. . . .” Id.
It should also be noted that neither Kingsdown nor State Industries involved
allegations of unreasonable prosecution delay or the associated equitable concerns.
In fact, the court in State Industries referred to the parties’ thrust and parry-like
conduct as a “fair fight.” See State Indus., 751 F.2d at 1236, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 424
(noting that public policy dictates that inventors should be allowed to monitor new
and competing products and to create equivalents unless the inventors do so in a
wrongful manner).
83. Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1349, No. CV-N-92-545
LDG, 1996 WL 673595 (D. Nev. Apr. 11, 1996).
84. Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1706, No. CV-N-92-613
LDG, 1997 WL 294430 (D. Nev. Apr. 28, 1997).
85. See Ford Motor Co., 1997 WL 294430, at **3-6 (emphasizing the “clear and
unambiguous language” of 35 U.S.C. § 120 and its legislative history as evidence of
congressional intent to permit continuation applications).
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Webster as limited to cases involving interferences. As to the specific
facts present in the case before it, the court held that the application
of laches inappropriately shifted the burden of establishing the
defense to the patentee by requiring him to explain the delay when
87
there was “no claim that [he] violated any statute or regulation.”
88
The court invoked the disclosure requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 as
the only limits on an applicant’s ability to add or amend claims
89
during prosecution.
Finally, although acknowledging Ford’s
argument that the case at bar presented a prime example of facts
justifying equitable intervention, the court reiterated its reluctance to
90
limit patent rights obtained in reliance on the statute.
Even the relevant Federal Circuit decisions reflected disagreement
regarding the viability of the defense of prosecution laches. In
91
Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. Northern Petrochemical Co., the court
affirmed the district court’s ruling refusing to invalidate patent rights
92
based on alleged inequitable prosecution delay.
The claims in
question had been issued twenty-two years after the priority
93
application was filed in the PTO. Although they had apparently
been pending throughout this period, their prosecution was
suspended for over sixteen of the twenty-two years while several
interferences involving the applicants’ related applications were
94
resolved.
According to the court, the applicants requested the
suspension only as a fallback to their request that the PTO issue the
95
claims in question before resolving the interferences. In addition,
the court noted that the PTO did not act on the applicants’ first
request to resume proceedings on the suspended application
following the termination of some of the interferences, but rather,
96
acted only after the applicants filed a second request.
On this
record, the court credited the district court’s findings that the PTO’s
86. See id., 1997 WL 294430, at **5-6.
87. Id., 1997 WL 294430, at **5-6.
88. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (proscribing the required specificity standards for
patent applications).
89. See Ford Motor, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1707-08, 1997 WL 294430, at **2-4
(noting that, in accordance with Section 120, new and amended claims must relate
to a specification disclosed in the originally filed application).
90. Id. at 1711, 1997 WL 294430, at *6. The Federal Circuit denied Ford’s
petition for permission to appeal the district court’s decision. Ford Motor Co. v.
Lemelson, No. Misc. 516, 1997 WL 547905 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 20, 1997).
91. 784 F.2d 351, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 837 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
92. See id. at 356, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 841 (examining the actions of the patent
applicants in obtaining the patent at issue).
93. Id. at 352, 356, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 838, 841.
94. Id. at 353, 356, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 839, 841.
95. Id. at 356, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 841.
96. Id., 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 841.
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failure to act on the applicant’s first request caused the delay. The
court further noted that the “the applicants’ actions in response . . .
involved no deliberate or calculated delay on the part of the
98
applicants or their attorneys.”
The Studiengesellschaft Kohle Court affirmed the district court on the
99
ground that the delay was the fault of the PTO. It indicated no
disapproval or doubt regarding the viability of the defense of
prosecution laches. Two years later, however, in Bott v. Four Star
100
Corp., a Federal Circuit panel, which included one member of the
101
Studiengesellschaft Kohle panel, rejected an argument that a patentee
should be equitably estopped from enforcing patent claims resulting
102
The
from the seventh in a series of continuation applications.
court relied on the absence of a time limit in Section 120 and the
presence of the two-year statutory limit on broadening reissues as
103
evidence of congressional intent not to limit continuation practice.
It also expressly rejected the defendant’s arguments that the
requested equitable relief remained available after the enactment of
104
the 1952 Patent Act. In the same vein, three years ago in Ricoh Co.
105
v. Nashua Corp.,
the court refused to apply the doctrine of
intervening rights to limit patent rights obtained via continuing
106
applications.
In summary, many of the relevant pre-Symbol Technologies lower
court decisions manifested significant judicial reluctance to act in
equity to abrogate patent rights on the ground of prosecution delay.
While a number of decisions indicate that the doctrine has vitality,
some of those demonstrate confusion regarding its outlines. For
example, the opinion in Pratt & Whitney appears to describe a classic
situation of prosecution laches by referencing the defendant’s
intervening rights, relying on Webster, and finding no reasonable
107
cause for the patentee’s delay in filing additional claims.
On the
97. Id., 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 841.
98. Id., 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 841.
99. Id., 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 841.
100. Nos. 88-1117, 88-1118, 1988 WL 54107 (Fed. Cir. May 26, 1988).
101. Circuit Judge Bissell participated on both panels.
102. See Bott, 1988 WL 54107, at *1 (noting that the plaintiff, Four Star Corp.,
argued for a two-year time limit on broadened claims similar to the time limit
imposed on proceedings under 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000)).
103. Bott, 1988 WL 54107, at *1.
104. See id. (emphasizing the lack of evidence within the legislative history of the
1952 Patent Act to support the application of equitable considerations).
105. No. 97-1244, 1999 WL 88969 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 18, 1999).
106. Id. at **2-3 (declining to adopt “equitable safeguards” where Congress had
imposed none, as evinced by its decision not to impose on continuation practice
limits comparable to those imposed on reissue applications).
107. See Pratt & Whitney Co. v. United States, 345 F.2d 838, 843-44, 145 U.S.P.Q.
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other hand, however, it appears that the claims in question simply
108
may not have been entitled to the benefit of the patent’s filing date.
Specifically, the Pratt & Whitney Court rejected as “not supported
by the facts,” the plaintiffs’ argument that the claims in question were
“not barred as a result of late claiming from claiming subject matter
relating to the [accused device] because [the patentee] had been
claiming in the patent application . . . the subject matter of the
109
[patent in suit] before the advent of” the accused device. Although
this language is admittedly unclear, it appears to invoke the
prosecution laches doctrine. However, the court also cited the
Supreme Court’s decision in Muncie Gear Works, Inc. v. Outboard
110
Marine & Manufacturing Co. that, although itself ambiguous, has
been interpreted widely as standing for the proposition that claims
dependent upon “new matter” introduced into a patent application
after its original filing date are invalid if the claimed subject matter
was in public use or on sale for longer than the applicable statutory
111
bar period before the new disclosure was added.
“New matter”
concerns are entirely distinct from those that have motivated the
application of prosecution laches, but the Muncie Gear Works decision
is not the only decision evincing confusion between the doctrines.
The Minnesota district court’s opinion in Honeywell Inc. v. Sperry
112
Rand Corp., concerning the validity and enforceability of claims
broadened after prosecution delays, similarly intersperses references
evocative of the Supreme Court’s prosecution laches decisions with
113
references to new matter type concerns. The opinion further defies
(BNA) 429, 432-33 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (addressing whether the plaintiff’s six-year delay in
filing the patent claims was unreasonable).
108. Such claims do not implicate the equity and policy concerns that underlie
the prosecution laches doctrine, because they are typically subject to statutory validity
challenges based on a broader pool of prior art than if they were entitled to the
benefit of a priority date.
109. See id., 145 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 433 (noting that, at the earliest, the plaintiff
introduced a claim that could cover the infringing device five years after the subject
matter of the parent application had been exposed to the public).
110. 315 U.S. 759 (1942).
111. See, e.g., Westphal v. Fawzi, 666 F.2d 575, 577, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 321, 322-23
(C.C.P.A. 1981) (repudiating the theory, known as “late claiming,” that claims
presented during prosecution, but that are entitled to the benefit of an earlier filing
date, could nonetheless be barred by intervening rights under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(2000)); Jacquard Knitting Mach. Co. v. Ordnance Gauge Co., 95 F. Supp. 902, 90607, 88 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 348, 350-51 (E.D. Pa. 1951) (rejecting the patent challenger’s
argument proposing that claims supported by the disclosure of a domestic priority
application were nonetheless barred by public use of the invention for longer than
the statutory pre-filing bar period prior to their presentation in the Patent Office).
112. 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673, No. 4-67 Civ. 138, 1973 WL 903 (D. Minn. Oct. 19,
1973).
113. See id. at *7. The court found that an amendment filed sixteen years after the
application filing date for the purpose of broadening the definition of a claim term
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interpretation by holding the claims affected by the broadening
amendment invalid for “late claiming” as a result of the
“unreasonable delay” in presenting the amendment, while also
finding that no undue or intentional delay in prosecution or issuance
of the patent existed, apparently because the application “did not
exceed any time limits provided either by court order, rule, or
114
statute.”
Ultimately, the court concluded that although the
patentee did not “deliberately extend the expiration of a monopoly”
to cause an undue delay, the patent was still unenforceable because
of “inherent consequences of delay in issuance due to six years of
inadequate presentation” on the part of the patentee and its legal
115
counsel.
This language is immediately followed with the following
statement, compounding the confusion:
Where many persons were at work in the same field and had made
advances in the art, and where the applicant learns of such work
and is aware that his original claims might not cover the real
advance made by his competitors, an intentional delay in the
prosecution of the patent to enable later changes in the
specification and claims so that the work of the other inventors
116
might be covered, renders the patent invalid.

Ultimately, the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Symbol
Technologies, and the ethics implications of that decision, must be
considered in light of the ambivalence and ambiguity in the decisions
that preceded it.

was an “exigent afterthought to capture the subsequent contributions of others
already in the public domain.” Id. The court discussed the “prior rights
intervening”—specifically, the “widespread manufacture, use and sale of computers”
having the capability recited in the broadening amendment—between the
application filing and amendment submission dates. Id. It observed that “late
claims” are invalid where an applicant “stands by to await developments in the
industry before asserting them,” but it also found, that “[w]here a late-filed
amendment of the patent specification is important enough to constitute the basis
for alleged patentability, the amendment constitutes new matter and cannot in fact
be a basis for patentability.” Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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II. SYMBOL TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. LEMELSON MEDICAL: A DIVIDED
FEDERAL CIRCUIT PANEL ROCKS THE BOAT (AND MUDDIES THE
WATERS)
A. A New Challenge
A little over a year after the decision of the Nevada district court
denying Ford’s motion for summary judgment and holding that
Lemelson’s patents were not unenforceable for continuing
application laches, several manufacturers of products incorporating
bar code technology filed declaratory judgment actions against the
Lemelson Medical, Education and Research Foundation (the
117
The
“Foundation”), the for-profit assignee of Lemelson’s patents.
manufacturers sought judgments that certain Foundation patents
were “invalid, unenforceable and not infringed by” them or their
118
customers.
The district court granted the Foundation’s motion to
dismiss the plaintiff’s prosecution laches cause of action on the
ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
119
granted.
In its January 2002 decision on the plaintiffs’ appeal, the Federal
Circuit characterized the “sole issue” as whether the doctrine of
prosecution laches is available as a defense to claims of patent
infringement that commenced after unreasonable and unexplained
delay despite the applicant’s compliance with the relevant rules and
120
regulations. The panel majority answered in the affirmative, citing
121
Woodbridge, Webster, and General Talking Pictures.
It rejected the
122
Foundation’s arguments that Webster was limited to interferences
123
and that the 1952 Patent Act abrogated the defense. With regard to
the latter, the majority, noted in particular, the specific enumeration
117. See Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 1363, 1368, 61
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1515, 1516, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 2002), petition for reh’g and reh’g en banc
denied, No. 00-1583, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 7712 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 20, 2002); see also
Neil Gross, Bar-Code Patents May Go Before the Bar, Again, BUS. WEEK, Nov. 2, 1998, at
131 (reporting the initiation of litigation by Cognex Corp.); Varchaver, supra note
71, at 216 (noting that seven other manufacturers followed suit).
118. Symbol Techs., 277 F.3d at 1363, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516.
119. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516.
120. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516.
121. Id. at 1363-65, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516-18. The Court subsequently
extended the Symbol Technologies principle, holding that the PTO has the authority to
refuse to issue a patent where the applicant has “fail[ed] to advance prosecution of
his application for an unreasonably long period.” See In re Bogese, 303 F.3d 1362,
1367, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1448, 1452 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
122. See id. at 1365, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450-51; see also Thomas Eschweiler,
supra note 7, at 458 (taking issue with the Ford Motor Court’s limitation of Webster to
interferences).
123. Symbol Techs., 277 F.3d at 1365-66, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517-19.

DOLAK.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

760

7/6/2004 7:30 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:739

of “unenforceability” among defenses available to a charge of
124
infringement in 35 U.S.C. § 282(1), and cited the comments of one
of the drafters of the Act that Section 282 includes “‘equitable
125
defenses such as laches, estoppel and unclean hands.’”
In dissent, Judge Newman distinguished Woodbridge as involving an
inventor who lost his right on statutory grounds and Webster as
126
“directed to interference practice.”
The judge seemed persuaded
that the 1952 Act at least reflected congressional intent that the
courts should refrain from punishing conduct that complies with the
127
statutes.
Emphasizing that a patent obtained “in accordance with
law” is a statutory property right, Judge Newman also regarded as
significant Congress’s decision to spare patents issued on applications
128
filed before June 8, 1995 from the twenty-year term.
She also
pointed out the practical consequences of the majority’s decision,
noting that “[i]t simply adds to the uncertainties of the patent grant,”
and “open[s] legally granted patents to a new source of satellite
litigation of unforeseen scope, for the continuation practice is
129
ubiquitous in patent prosecution.”
B. A Correct Decision
The Federal Circuit majority in Symbol Technologies correctly held
that prosecution laches, recognized and applied in several Supreme
Court decisions, survived the 1952 codification of the law relating to
continuing applications.
The Supreme Court’s application of
130
prosecution laches
and its apparent ratification of the then131
common law continuing application practice, the absence of any
124. 35 U.S.C. § 282(1) (2000).
125. Symbol Techs., 277 F.3d at 1366, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519 (quoting P.J.
Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 161,
215 (1993)). The majority also rejected the Foundation’s argument that its opinions
in Bott and Ricoh were binding on the court. See id. at 1366-68, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1518-20.
126. See id. at 1368-70, 61U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520-22 (Newman, J., dissenting).
127. Judge Newman repeatedly noted that Lemelson complied fully with all
applicable statutes and regulations in procuring the patents at issue. Id. at 1368-71,
61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520-23.
128. See id. at 1371, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
129. Id. at 1369, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521.
130. See supra notes 8-29 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Ferdinand Gutmann Co., 304 U.S. 159,
164-68 (1938) (holding that a nine and one-half year delay by a patent applicant in
order to maximize his profits constituted unreasonable delay, making laches
applicable); Chapman v. Wintroath, 252 U.S. 126, 137 (1920) (holding that, absent
applicant wrongdoing, a patent applicant’s statutory rights may not be denied merely
because a delay in exercising those rights may cause prejudice). See also Godfrey v.
Eames, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 317, 325-26 (1864), where the Court stated:
[I]f a party choose to withdraw his application for a patent, and pay the
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legislative history evidencing congressional intent to abrogate the
132
defense, and the enumeration of the defense of “unenforceability”
133
in 35 U.S.C. § 282(1) compel this conclusion. Federal courts
indisputably possess the authority to act in equity to limit rights—
even statutory rights. For example, there is no basis for conceding
that courts can abrogate or limit a statutory right to patent damages
134
on account of pre-enforcement laches while denying, or even
advocating that they restrain from exercising, their power to declare
forfeited the statutory right to enforce patent claims against an
135
infringer.
Analogy to unenforceability for inequitable conduct is also
appropriate. A determination of inequitable conduct results in the
complete unenforceability of a patent’s claims, even those untainted
136
by the deception.
Accordingly, that the PTO Rules of Practice in
Patent Cases expressly impose a “duty of candor and good faith” on
137
patent applicants does not undermine the parallelism.
This is
because untainted claims—those obtained in compliance with
statutory and regulatory requirements—are subject to abrogation.
The Code of Federal Regulations Title 37, Section 1.56 states that “no
patent will be granted on an application in connection with which
fraud on the Office was practiced or attempted or the duty of
forfeit, intending at the time of such withdrawal to file a new petition, and
he accordingly do so, the two petitions are to be considered as parts of the
same transaction, and both as constituting one continuous application,
within the meaning of the law.
132. See Symbol Techs., 277 F.3d at 1365-66, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517-18 (“The
legislative history of Section 120 does not indicate any congressional intent to alter
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of continuing application practices”) (quoting
Transco Prods. Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 38 F.3d 551, 556-57, 32
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1077, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also Eschweiler, supra note 7, at
408-13 (discussing the impact of the passage of Section 120 on the defense of
prosecution laches); Marcus, supra note 37, at 560-63 (discussing that the 1952 Act
did not materially change existing law governing the defenses available to
infringement, among which is laches).
133. 35 U.S.C. § 282(1) (2000).
134. See, e.g., A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1031,
22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1232, 1327-28 (1992) (holding that the right to interpose the
equitable defense of laches in patent litigation is still available).
135. See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2000) (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for
infringement of his patent.”).
136. See, e.g., Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867,
877, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384, 1392 (1998) (“When a court has finally determined
that inequitable conduct occurred in relation to one or more claims during
prosecution of the patent application, the entire patent is rendered unenforceable.”)
(emphasis added).
137. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2003). Furthermore, it has been argued that “Rule 56 is
outside . . . the PTO’s rulemaking authority and even the Administrative Procedure
Act.” See Carl M. Moy, The Effect of Rule 56 on the Law of Inequitable Conduct, 74 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 257, 259 (1992). If so, the courts’ authority to declare
patents unenforceable for inequitable conduct is entirely non-statutory.
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disclosure was violated through bad faith or intentional
138
This statement does not provide a basis for
misconduct.”
distinguishing the court’s power to declare unenforceable patents
procured via inequitable conduct from those procured in compliance
with congressionally-authorized regulation, given the PTO’s 1988
proclamation that it would “no longer investigate . . . applications
139
under 37 C.F.R. 1.56.”
C. A Host of Questions
Although the Symbol Technologies’ majority correctly applied the law
of prosecution laches, Judge Newman’s assessment of the decision’s
implications is undeniably accurate. Regardless of the resolution of
140
this case, the Federal Circuit’s ruling introduces new uncertainties
141
142
for some patentees and will foster additional litigation.
Unless
143
the Federal Circuit repudiates its January 2002 decision, or the
144
Supreme Court ultimately rejects the viability of the doctrine,
138. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2003); see also PTO Notice Regarding Implementation of 37
C.F.R. § 221.56, 1095 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OFF. 16 (Sept. 8, 1988).
139. Id.
140. On January 23, 2004, the district court held the asserted claims in the
patents-in-suit in Symbol Technologies “unenforceable due to prosecution laches.”
Symbol Techs. Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 2004 WL 161331, at *5 (D. Nev. Jan. 23, 2004).
The court noted that “[d]ecades of delay preceded the assertion of patent claims and
Lemelson has offered no adequate explanation for that delay.” Id. at *5. The court
further noted the “intervening private and public rights . . . evidenced by the use of
products developed, manufactured and sold by [the declaratory judgment plaintiffs]
as well as by third-party products, patents and articles . . . .” Id. at *6. The Federal
Circuit may, therefore, have an opportunity shortly to confirm and further define the
doctrine of prosecution laches.
141. Even the court in Ford Motor suggested that the Lemelson saga presents a
situation unparalleled in its aggressive use of the patent system. Ford Motor Co. v.
Lemelson, Nos. CV-N-92-613-LDG, CV-N-92-545-LDG, 1995 WL 628330 (D. Nev. June
16, 1995). As a consequence, a decision holding the patent rights at issue
unenforceable may provide little guidance for other cases.
142. See Symbol Techs. Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 1368-70, 61
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1515, 1520-22 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Newman, J., dissenting)
(discussing the concern that the majority’s decision in Symbol Technologies will create a
“new source of satellite litigation of unforeseen scope”); see, e.g., Oxaal v. Internet
Pictures Corp., No. 00CV1863, 2002 WL 485704, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2002)
(granting defendant’s motion seeking an order for leave to file and serve an
amended answer asserting the defense of prosecution laches in light of the Federal
Circuit’s decision in Symbol Technologies).
143. Three Federal Circuit judges voted to rehear the appeal in Symbol Technologies
en banc, while another five did not participate in the vote. See Symbol Techs. Inc. v.
Lemelson Med., No. 00-1583, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 7712, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 20,
2002).
144. Such a result seems unlikely given the relative rarity of Supreme Court review
and the Court’s own prior decisions on the subject. On the other hand, those
decisions did precede all of the very significant legislative activity in the patent arena
in the last fifty years. Additionally, Judge Newman’s description of a patent as a
“property right,” Symbol Technologies, 277 F.3d at 1371, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522,
has added significance due to the Supreme Court’s incorporation of the same
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attempts by litigants to explore the boundaries of the prosecution
laches defense can be expected.
This litigation will likely involve all of the questions left open by the
145
Supreme Court’s prosecution laches jurisprudence, in addition to
those issues muddied by other courts that have encountered the
146
The Federal Circuit’s recent decision requires,
doctrine.
147
appropriately, prejudice to intervening adverse rights. The Federal
Circuit’s interpretation of the Supreme Court precedent also
arguably suggests that the addition or expansion of claims following
148
applicant delay is necessary to assert the defense of laches.
But
definitive answers to these and many other questions await resolution
of Symbol Technologies and other cases.
Among the most significant of the unresolved questions is whether
the twenty-year term relegates the doctrine—just roused from
slumber—to “flash in the pan” status. Patents issued on applications
filed on or after June 8, 1995, have a maximum potential term of
twenty years from the filing date of the first domestic priority
149
application. One view is that the issue of prosecution laches is, as a
150
result, “going away.” Another holds that where the patents at issue
concern fast-developing technology, courts may be receptive to the
defense of prosecution laches even when the twenty-year term
reference in its recent unanimous opinion vacating the Federal Circuit’s decision
circumscribing the doctrine of equivalents. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1709 (2002).
145. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 107-116 and accompanying text.
147. See Symbol Techs., 277 F.3d at 1364-65, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517-18.
148. See id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517-18. The court in Progressive Games v.
Amusements Extra, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1184 n.1, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1849,
1852 n.1 (D. Colo. 1999), purported that “adverse intervening rights” require the
addition of broadened claims after the rise of third party rights. Such an
interpretation appears necessary to any prosecution laches challenge to a patent,
subject to the twenty-year term, especially if the application(s) in question were
published during their pendency. Otherwise, the challenger could not establish the
requisite prejudice. However, neither Supreme Court precedent nor policy
considerations compel such an interpretation of patents procured via applications
filed before the twenty-year term took effect. In such cases, prejudice could, for
example, result simply from unreasonable delay in permitting claims pending before
the adverse rights arose to issue, because the potential term of enforcement had,
thereby, been extended.
149. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). Had this been the law when the patents at
issue in the Ford Motor and Symbol Technologies cases were procured, for example, the
latest those patents would have been in force would have been 1976.
The publication of pending U.S. patent applications pursuant to the recentlyenacted 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2000) should certainly impair the ability of patent
challengers to establish prosecution laches, since presumably no prejudice as to the
subject matter of published claims could be shown. Of course not all pending U.S.
applications—even those filed on or after the effective date of the new eighteenmonth publication requirements—are subject to publication. See id. § 122(b)(2)(B).
150. See Eschweiler, supra note 7, at 426.
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151

applies.
Litigants can certainly be expected to advance these and
other, even more creative, positions.
III. PROSECUTION LACHES: IMPLICATIONS FOR
PROSECUTION COUNSEL
As discussed above, the Federal Circuit’s decision in Symbol
Technologies is doctrinally sound. Others will, no doubt, explore its
propriety as a matter of judicial policy. The focus of the present
inquiry concerns the decision’s ramifications regarding the ethical
obligations of patent prosecution counsel. It is necessary to bear in
mind the history of the prosecution laches doctrine when assessing
those ramifications.
152
All patent practitioners, including patent agents, are obligated to
observe the PTO’s Code of Professional Responsibility (“PTO
153
154
Code”), and are subject to discipline for violations thereof.
151. See Edward T. Colbert & Kenneth R. Corsello, Prosecution Laches, NAT’L L.J.,
Feb. 25, 2002, at A19. The argument that a patent, subject to a twenty-year term, is
per se immune from a prosecution laches challenge has been rejected in at least two
rulings to date. See Cummins-Allison Corp. v. Glory Ltd., No. 02C7008, 2003 WL
355470, at *41 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2003) (finding that prosecution laches can be
asserted, as a matter of law, in defense of post-GATT patents); Digital Control Inc. v.
McLaughlin Mfg. Co., 225 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1228, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1786, 1790
(W.D. Wash. 2002) (noting that “the impact of delay is less” for a twenty year term
limited patent, but refusing to adopt a bright-line rule sparing such patents scrutiny).
The court in Digital Control further refused to limit prosecution laches to patents not
subject to a terminal disclaimer. See id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1790. See also
Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1143 (E.D. Cal. 2002)
(rejecting a “bright line rule” that prosecution laches does not apply to patents
limited by a terminal disclaimer as “contrary to the principle that ‘with its origin in
equity, a determination of laches is not made upon the application of mechanical
rules’”) (quoting A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020,
1032, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
Ultimately, the Digital Control Court granted the patentee’s motion for partial
summary judgment on the defense of prosecution laches. See Digital Control Inc. v.
McLaughlin Mfg. Co., 248 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1017-19 (W.D. Wash. 2003). There, the
challenged continuation patents issued over the span of a decade following the filing
of the original application, apparently after the PTO restricted prosecution in the
original application to one of several claimed inventions. See id. at 1017-19.
According to the court, the patentee’s delay was “reasonable and explained by the
directives of the PTO.” Id. at 1019.
The change in the length of the patent term does not, of course, directly affect the
susceptibility, on prosecution laches grounds, of patents procured and patent
applications filed before the twenty-year term took effect. As noted above, however,
Judge Newman invoked Congress’ decision to limit the applicability of the twentyyear term to patents issued on applications filed on or after June 8, 1995 as evidence
of its intent to reject limits on earlier-filed continuation applications.
152. As to patent matters, the PTO defines “practitioner” as “an attorney or agent
registered to practice before the Office . . . .” 37 C.F.R. § 10.1(r) (2003).
153. The PTO recently issued a comprehensive set of proposed rules relating to
client representation, including new professional responsibility rules which would
replace the current PTO Code. Changes to Representation of Others Before the
United States Patent and Trademark Office, 68 Fed. Reg. 69442 (2003) (to be
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155

Several provisions of the PTO Code are potentially implicated by
conduct that arguably constitutes or facilitates prosecution laches. A
discussion of the appropriate interpretation of these provisions in the
context of prosecution laches follows an identification of some of
156
those provisions.
A. Potentially Relevant PTO Rules
1.

Signature and certification requirements
The provisions of 37 C.F.R. § 10.18 correspond, in significant
157
respect, to those of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 11.
Section 10.18 requires that all documents filed in the PTO in patent
matters, except those that require the applicant’s signature, be signed
158
by the practitioner filing the document.
The section further
provides that:
codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 2, 10, & 11) (proposed Dec. 12, 2003). The proposed
rules carry forward, in large measure, the principles and provisions discussed in this
Article. For example, proposed Section 11.18 and proposed Rule 11.804 maintain
the signature and certification requirements of current Section 10.18 and the
misconduct prohibitions current Rule 10.23, respectively, in material respect.
Proposed Rule 11.302(b) corresponds in material respect to current Rule 10.85(a).
Interestingly, however, proposed Rule 11.302(a) embodies essential ethical tension a
practitioner faces when representing a client whose interests are served by delaying,
stating “[a] practitioner shall make reasonable efforts to expedite proceedings
before the [PTO] consistent with the interests of the client.”
The PTO recently extended the comment period for the proposed professional
responsibility rules. Notice of Extension of Comment Period, 69 Fed. Reg. 4269
(Jan. 29, 2004). The period is now set to expire on April 12, 2004.
154. See id. § 10.130. Practitioners, licensed to practice by one or more attorneylicensing authorities, are also potentially subject to discipline for violations of state
ethics rules. See Kroll v. Finnerty, 242 F.3d 1359, 1366, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097,
1102 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the PTO Rules do not preempt state law
governing the practice of law). However, because this section concerns prosecution
activities, it focuses on the PTO’s ethics requirements.
155. PTO Rule 10.18, discussed infra notes 157-158 and 176-179 and
accompanying text, is codified apart from the rules—37 C.F.R. § 10.20-.129—that
constitute the PTO Code. As discussed infra note 159 and accompanying text,
however, Rule 10.18 includes its own provision for disciplinary sanction for violations
thereof.
156. The discussion that follows is intended merely to illustrate that prosecution
laches, in the wake of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Symbol Technologies potentially
implicates a practitioner’s ethical responsibilities.
It is not intended as a
comprehensive analysis of every PTO ethics rule that could conceivably be
interpreted to apply to prosecution laches.
157. Compare 37 C.F.R. § 10.18 (2002) (explaining that documents filed with PTO
must be signed, and that the signature denotes, among other things, that statements
within document are true and are not presented for improper purpose), with FED. R.
CIV. P. 11 (indicating that documents filed in federal court must be signed by an
attorney and that the signature denotes, among other things, that documents are not
presented for an improper purpose and that allegations within them are supported
by evidence).
158. 37 C.F.R. § 10.18(a) (2002).
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By presenting to the Office (whether by signing, filing, submitting,
or later advocating) any paper, the party presenting such paper,
whether a practitioner or non-practitioner, is certifying that . . .
[t]o the best of the party’s knowledge, information and belief,
formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, . . .
[t]he paper is not being presented for any improper purpose, such
as to harass someone or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
159
increase in the cost of prosecution before the Office . . . .

Violations of this provision “are, after notice and reasonable
opportunity to respond, subject to such sanctions as deemed
appropriate by the Commissioner, or the Commissioner’s
160
designee.”
Furthermore, “[a]ny practitioner violating the
161
provisions of this section may also be subject to disciplinary action.”
2.

PTO disciplinary rules
The PTO Code, patterned in significant part after the American
162
Bar Association’s “Model Code of Professional Responsibility,”
consists of nine “Canons” and numerous associated “Disciplinary
Rules.” Canons are defined as “statements of axiomatic norms,
expressing in general terms the standards of professional conduct
expected of practitioners in their relationships with the public, with
163
the legal system, and with the legal profession.” Disciplinary Rules,
however, are “mandatory in character and state the minimum level of
conduct below which no practitioner can fall without being subjected
164
to disciplinary action.” PTO regulations authorize the investigation
of possible Disciplinary Rule violations, the initiation of and
procedures for proceedings to resolve disciplinary charges, and the
165
imposition of sanctions for violations.

159. Id. § 10.18(b)(2)(i).
160. Id. § 10.18(c). According to the rule, the potential sanctions for violating the
“improper purpose” rule include, but are not limited to, any combination of:
(1) Holding certain facts to have been established;
(2) Returning papers;
(3) Precluding a party from filing a paper, or presenting or contesting an
issue;
(4) Imposing a monetary sanction;
(5) Requiring a terminal disclaimer for the period of the delay; or
(6) Terminating the proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office.
Id. § 10.18(c).
161. Id. § 10.18(d).
162. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (1969).
163. 37 C.F.R. § 10.20(a) (2003).
164. Id. § 10.20(b).
165. Id. §§ 10.130-.170.
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Negative rules (prohibitions)

Several Disciplinary Rules are potentially implicated by conduct
constituting prosecution laches. Rule 10.23(a) states that “[a]
166
practitioner shall not engage in disreputable or gross misconduct.”
Rule 10.23(b) recites a list of “shall nots” for practitioners, including
prohibitions against “[v]iolat[ing] a Disciplinary Rule,” and
“[e]ngag[ing] in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
167
justice.” More particularly, Rule 10.23(c) provides that “[c]onduct
which constitutes a violation of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section
168
includes, but is not limited to” a long list of specifically enumerated
offenses, including “[s]igning a paper filed in the Office in violation
169
of the provisions of § 10.18.”
This provision therefore expressly
brings violations of the signing and certifications provisions quoted
above within the purview of the investigation and adjudication system
established for PTO Code violations.
Rules 10.39 and 10.85 may also be relevant. Rule 10.39(a), for
example, provides that:
A practitioner shall not accept employment on behalf of a person if
the practitioner knows or it is obvious that such person wishes to:
(a) Bring a legal action, commence a proceeding before the Office,
conduct a defense, assert a position in any proceeding pending
before the Office, or otherwise have steps taken for the person,
merely for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any
170
other person.

According to Rule 10.85(a), while representing a client, [a]
practitioner shall not:
(1) Initiate or defend any proceeding before the Office, assert a
position, conduct a defense, delay a trial or proceeding before the
Office, or take other action on behalf of the practitioner’s client
when the practitioner knows or when it is obvious that such action
would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another . . . [or]
(8) Knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary
171
to a Disciplinary Rule.

Furthermore, “[i]n appearing in a professional capacity before a
tribunal, a practitioner shall not . . . [i]ntentionally or habitually
172
violate any provision of this subchapter.”
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. § 10.23(a).
Id. § 10.23(b)(1), (5).
Id. § 10.23(c).
Id. § 10.23(c)(15).
Id. § 10.39(a).
Id. § 10.85(a)(1), (8).
Id. § 10.89(c)(6). The rules define “tribunal” as including the PTO itself. See
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Positive rules (obligations)

These prohibitions must be balanced against the affirmative
obligations imposed by the PTO Code.
These affirmative
prohibitions include the requirement, set forth in Rule 10.84,
entitled “Representing a client zealously,” that “a practitioner shall
not intentionally . . . [f]ail to seek the lawful objectives of a client
through reasonably available means permitted by law and the
173
Disciplinary Rules.” The same rule, however, permits a practitioner
to “[r]efuse to aid or participate in conduct that the practitioner
believes to be unlawful, even though there is some support for an
174
argument that the conduct is legal.”
A practitioner must also
175
preserve his or her client’s “confidence[s]” and “secret[s].”
B. A New Ethical Dilemma?
The rules identified above can be read to encompass conduct
constituting or contributing to prosecution laches.
Rule
10.18(b)(2)(i) expressly requires a practitioner to certify, each time
she files a paper, that the paper is not being filed “to cause
176
unnecessary delay.” Presumably, in a case justifying the exercise of
equitable relief based on prosecution laches, attorneys filed several
(perhaps numerous) papers including continuation applications,
petitions for extensions of time to respond, and responses the
practitioner knew would not advance the prosecution. As far as the
177
accused infringer and the PTO are concerned, such documents
id. § 10.1(z) (2003) (instructing that “tribunal” includes “the Office,” which is
defined in subsection (p) as “Patent and Trademark Office”).
173. Id. § 10.84(a)(1) (2003). Although Rule 10.84 expresses its requirements as
negative prohibitions (e.g., “shall not . . . fail”), Rule 10.84(a)(1) effectively obligates
practitioner to “seek the lawful objectives” of their clients. Id.
174. Id. § 10.84(b)(2).
175. Id. § 10.57(b)(1). A “confidence” is “information protected by the attorneyclient or agent-client privilege under applicable law.” Id. § 10.57(a). A “secret” is
“other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has
requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or
would be likely to be detrimental to the client.” Id.
In certain specified circumstances, Rule 10.57 authorizes, but does not require, the
disclosure of client confidences and secrets. See id. § 10.57(c) (allowing disclosure
with consent of client, when permitted or required by law or Disciplinary Rules, or as
necessary to collect fees and defend against accusations of wrongful conduct).
176. Id. § 10.18(b)(2)(i).
177. Interestingly, at least one accused infringer supplemented its prosecution
laches defense with an argument that the patent in question should not be enforced
because Rule 10.18 was violated. See Bott v. Four Star Corp., Nos. 88-1117, 88-1118,
1988 WL 54107, at *2 (Fed. Cir. May 26, 1988). Although Federal Circuit rules
prohibit citation of the opinion in Bott, it is worth noting that the court did not
dismiss this argument out-of-hand, stating only that the defendant had “alleged
generally that this rule was violated but has not set forth facts to support any specific
violation.” Bott, 1988 WL 54107, at *2.
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were produced to cause “unnecessary delay” and/or “needless
178
Given the
increase in the cost of prosecution before the Office.”
requirement that a party asserting prosecution laches demonstrate
prejudice, it can even be argued that a late-filed amendment
presenting claims calculated to cover the intervening products of that
party was presented “to harass” it, in violation of Rule
179
10.18(b)(2)(i).
The latter interpretation would also arguably implicate Rule
10.39(a), to the extent “the practitioner knows or it is obvious that
[his client] wishes,” for example, “to . . . assert a position . . . or
otherwise have steps taken . . . merely for the purpose of harassing or
180
The elements of
maliciously injuring any other person.”
prosecution laches, unreasonable delay plus prejudice, possess
considerable symmetry with the conduct prohibited by Rule
10.85(a)(1), namely that a practitioner shall not delay a proceeding
in the PTO “when [he] knows or when it is obvious that such action
181
would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another.”
However, a number of considerations counsel restraint, for the
time being at least, in applying the disciplinary rules to prosecution
laches situations. Principal among these is the fact that the Federal
182
Circuit’s Symbol Technologies decision is very recent. Its procedural
posture, a successful appeal from a dismissal for failure to state a
claim, is also significant. All the Federal Circuit has said, thus far, is
183
that it is possible to state a prosecution laches-based challenge.
Much about when such a challenge should be regarded as successful
remains to be determined, both in any appeal from the remand
determination in Symbol Technologies and in future cases. The
decision is thus very preliminary, and when viewed against the
184
background of its rather tortured history, it is properly regarded as
185
a significant departure from prior law.
178. 37 C.F.R. § 10.18(b)(2)(i) (2002).
179. Id. § 10.18(b)(2)(i). The same analysis would apply to Rule 10.23(c)(15), as
it prohibits violations of Rule 10.18.
180. Id. § 10.39(a).
181. Id. § 10.85(a)(1).
182. Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1515 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
183. See id. at 1366, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519 (reversing lower court decision
that defense of prosecution laches was unavailable as a matter of law, thus allowing
Symbol Technologies to assert defense on remand).
184. See supra discussion Part I (explaining the reluctance of many courts to
employ prosecution laches doctrine, despite recognition by many that the doctrine is
viable, because of confusion about the doctrine’s parameters).
185. The District Court for the Northern District of New York recently cited the
significance of this change in its decision to grant an infringement defendant leave
to amend its answer to assert prosecution laches. See Oxaal v. Internet Pictures
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Furthermore, notwithstanding the magistrate judge’s analysis in
186
Ford Motor, the Federal Circuit’s en banc holding in Kingsdown that it
is not “improper to amend or insert claims intended to cover a
competitor’s product the applicant’s attorney has learned about
187
during the prosecution of a patent application,” cannot be readily
dismissed, at least not in the context of considering potential ethical
implications of prosecution laches. Admittedly, Kingsdown did not
188
involve allegations of unreasonable prosecution delay. However, it
pertained to another, significantly analogous, basis for holding claims
189
unenforceable on grounds of equity—inequitable conduct.
In
addition, the language quoted from Kingsdown concerns the
knowledge and conduct of the practitioner, and should, therefore, be
given weighty consideration when evaluating past practitioner
190
conduct.
In view of these considerations, at least as to conduct
predating the decision in Symbol Technologies that is alleged or even
adjudicated to constitute prosecution laches, no ethical violations
should be found.
Even as to post-Symbol Technologies practitioner conduct, the many
unresolved questions concerning prosecution laches, together with its
legacy of confusion, should give the courts and disciplinary
authorities pause in evaluating whether such conduct involves ethical
violations. As noted above, practitioners are duty-bound to represent
191
their clients zealously.
This obligation, combined with the
prevailing uncertainty surrounding the defense of prosecution
laches, entitles practitioners to the benefit of the doubt.
On the other hand, practitioners are, as a result of the Symbol
Technologies decision, “on notice.” At a minimum, they have an
obligation to monitor doctrinal developments, and be wary when they
are instructed or when they suspect that their clients’ objectives
include maintaining application pendency for the purpose of
awaiting and responding, with new or amended claims, to

Corp., Nos. 13, 15, 2002 WL 485704, at *2 (N.D. N.Y. Mar. 27, 2002).
186. Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, Nos. CV-N-92-545-613-LDG, CV-N-92-545-LDG,
1995 WL 628330 (D. Nev. June 16, 1995); see supra notes 74-82 and accompanying
text (discussing the procedural history of the Lemelson cases).
187. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 874, 9
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
188. Id. at 869, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386.
189. Id. at 877, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1392.
190. See Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1143 (E.D. Cal.
2002) (noting that although Kingsdown “did not address the question of how a long
period of delay affects the equities,” its “discussion of what is and is not equitable
behavior by patentees is relevant” to the issue of prosecution laches).
191. See 37 C.F.R. § 10.84 (2003).
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192

marketplace developments. Practitioners should also re-familiarize
themselves with the PTO’s rules regarding withdrawal from
employment, which is required, for example, in circumstances that
would preclude the acceptance of employment under Rule 10.39(a),
or where “continued employment will result in violation of a
193
Disciplinary Rule.”
CONCLUSION
Although the Federal Circuit’s decision in Symbol Technologies opens
a new avenue of defense for some accused infringers, declarations of
unenforceability based on prosecution laches are likely to be reserved
for the most extreme cases.
Disciplinary consequences for
practitioners should be commensurably rare, even for post-Symbol
Technologies conduct. As discussed in the Article, the patent statute
and rules of practice authorize, or at least do not proscribe, the
conduct at issue, and the applicable ethics rules exert somewhat
conflicting tensions upon practitioners. However, while Symbol
Technologies provides reason enough for practitioners to counsel their
clients against unreasonable tactical delays, practitioners must
recognize that their clients are not the only ones who risk severe
consequences for such conduct.

192. See Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 60
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1482 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (upholding an award of attorneys’ fee in an
on-sale bar case where Brasseler withheld information about sale from its attorneys
and attorneys purposefully did not investigate matter). Brasseler is relevant
considering the PTO Code provisions requiring that practitioner conduct a
reasonable investigation before submitting papers and imposing ethical obligations
when the practitioner either knows or “it is obvious” that his client wishes to engage
in proscribed conduct.
193. See 37 C.F.R. § 10.40(b) (2003); see also id. § 10.40(a), (c) (imposing
limitations on a practitioner’s ability to withdraw from a proceeding before the
PTO).

